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Open Access Article
1 - God’s Will in Ṭūsī, Mullā Ṣadrā, and ‘Allāmah Ṭabāṭabā’ī
Armin Mansouri Ali AlahbedashtiThe howness of God’s Will is one of the problems that has provoked a lot of discussion in the field of theology. Although all philosophers have accepted God’s Will as a Divine Attribute, there are several disagreements in its interpretation. The purpose of this paper is MoreThe howness of God’s Will is one of the problems that has provoked a lot of discussion in the field of theology. Although all philosophers have accepted God’s Will as a Divine Attribute, there are several disagreements in its interpretation. The purpose of this paper is to investigate, compare, and evaluate the views of Khwājah Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī, Mullā Ṣadrā, and ‘Allāmah Ṭabāṭabā’ī in terms of the semantics, origin, and ontology of God’s Will. Ṭūsī maintains that will is the same as motive, which is the same as knowledge of the goodness of act, and thus believes in God’s essential will as an essential attribute. Mullā Ṣadrā also adds the sameness of love with will to the sameness of the knowledge of goodness of act with act and introduces will as an essential attribute. Moreover, he justifies the Infallible Imam’s narrations regarding the sameness of will with act by changing its meaning from having the intention to perform an act to the making and changing of its level from essence to the level of actual existents. However, ‘Allāmah Ṭabāṭabā’ī views the identity of free will with the knowledge of the best system as a verbal conflict and a merely different denomination. He disagrees with equating free will with any essential attribute (such as love) other than knowledge. Thus he maintains that free will is not an essential attribute but is, rather, abstracted from the level of act and is one of its attributes. He also introduces the essence of an act that occurs in the outside or the presence of perfect cause for the act as its source of abstraction. It seems that ٬Allāmah’s change of ontological view of free will and considering it an actual attribute in justifying rational constraints are more accurate than regarding it as an essential attribute without paying attention to the conceptual difference between free will and knowledge and love, which has been propounded by Ṭūsī and Mullā Ṣadrā. Manuscript profile -
Open Access Article
2 - A Comparative Study of the Views of Mullā Ṣadrā and ‘Allāmah Ṭabāṭabā’ī Regarding Ambiguous Verses in the Qur’an
Davood SaemiAccording to Mullā Ṣadrā and ‘Allāmah Ṭabāṭabā’ī, Qur’anic verses enjoy both exoteric and esoteric meanings. When dealing with ambiguous verses, one must focus on their exoteric meanings and not to ignore them. In the view of both philosophers, the understanding of ambi MoreAccording to Mullā Ṣadrā and ‘Allāmah Ṭabāṭabā’ī, Qur’anic verses enjoy both exoteric and esoteric meanings. When dealing with ambiguous verses, one must focus on their exoteric meanings and not to ignore them. In the view of both philosophers, the understanding of ambiguous or metaphorical verses is relative and depends on individuals’ virtues and level of knowledge. They believe that knowledgeable people know the different meanings of ambiguous verses and, in fact, do not see any ambiguity there. However, based on the theory of specific oneness, Mullā Ṣadrā contends that all levels of being, from the highest to the lowest, enjoy existential hierarchy. Therefore, he maintains that, without needing to interpret ambiguous verses or the idea of incarnation regarding the essence of the Almighty, one can maintain the exoteric meaning of the verses based on the philosophical-gnostic principles of the specific oneness of being and interpret the meanings of ambiguous verses based on their surface meanings. In this way, the word “ambiguous” is semantically expanded. Nevertheless, ‘Allāmah Ṭabāṭabā’ī believes in referring ambiguities to clear definitions and interprets ambiguous verses based on clear ones. He acknowledges the possibility of interpretation of all Qur’anic verses, whether ambiguous and straight forward, and states that all ambiguous verses can be clarified by referring to unambiguous ones. In this study, the author sides with Mullā Ṣadrā’s view in comparison to ‘Allāmah Ṭabāṭabā’ī’s because he finds it of a more solid and principled basis. Manuscript profile -
Open Access Article
3 - Theoretical Changes about the Faculty of Estimation in the Course of Historical Development of Islamic Philosophy
Mohammad-Ali ArdestaniThe faculty of estimation is one of the inner, particular, and perceptive powers of the soul that plays a significant role in particular cognitions, and without which it is impossible to organize and balance life affairs. Its potential of transcending the realm of meani MoreThe faculty of estimation is one of the inner, particular, and perceptive powers of the soul that plays a significant role in particular cognitions, and without which it is impossible to organize and balance life affairs. Its potential of transcending the realm of meanings has placed it on top of all inner particular powers. Following a descriptive-analytic evaluation method, the present paper examines the development of the views of Muslim philosophers in this regard. Three important theories stand out in this process. In their quest to attribute a specific source to each kind of perception, Peripatetic philosophers consider the faculty of estimation to be independent from others, place it alongside the faculties of sensation, imagination, and intellect, and emphasize that it can perceive the nature of all specific universals. Accordingly, perceptions are divided in two four sensory, imaginative, estimative, and rational types. Among the followers of the Transcendent Philosophy, some philosophers such as Mullā Hādī Sabziwārī have advocated the Peripatetics on this ground, but Mullā Ṣadrā and ‘Allāmah Ṭabāṭabā’ī have criticized this theory each in their own way. Mullā Ṣadrā has promoted the faculty of estimation to the level of the intellect and placed it at the level of revealed intellect. Accordingly, perceptions are divided into three sensory, imaginative, and rational types. However, ‘Allāmah Ṭabāṭabā’ī has attributed the faculty of estimation to the common sense and demoted its status to the level of the senses. He acknowledges the unity of sensory, imaginative, and estimative perceptions. Manuscript profile