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        1 - The Place of Practical Wisdom with Emphasis on Ethics in Avicenna's Philosophy
        mohammadreza asadi  
        Following philosophers preceding him, Avicenna divided wisdom into theoretical and practical categories and recognized the latter as being a sibling of philosophy. He considered its end to be man's perfection and happiness both in the world and in the hereafter. In expl More
        Following philosophers preceding him, Avicenna divided wisdom into theoretical and practical categories and recognized the latter as being a sibling of philosophy. He considered its end to be man's perfection and happiness both in the world and in the hereafter. In explaining theoretical and practical ration, Avicenna considered theoretical ration to be the means of perceiving generalities – no matter generalities which exist or those supposed to have to exist – and practical ration to be at the service of the former and the means of perceiving details pertaining to acts and motives. Therefore, practical wisdom – defined as the knowledge of general truths relating to man's deeds – is derived from theoretical ration, the sources of which are axioms, rumors and reliable experiences and can therefore be verified or denied. Avicenna has addressed practical wisdom in some brief treatises which are not considerable in comparison to his works on theoretical wisdom. However, given these brief discussions beside the sources he explained for practical wisdom, it is fair to say that Avicennan wisdom has something to say in practical wisdom, especially on ethics. Manuscript profile
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        2 - Review and critique of Ibn Sina's reasons for self-denial
        Faryal Eskandari Mohammad saedimehr amirabas alizamani
        Avicenna believes that human souls do not exist without their bodies, and then, they are created in their bodies. because if they exist without and before their bodies , they all have a single existence, but the Plurality is not permissible ;Avicenna says this because o More
        Avicenna believes that human souls do not exist without their bodies, and then, they are created in their bodies. because if they exist without and before their bodies , they all have a single existence, but the Plurality is not permissible ;Avicenna says this because of he believes that plurality is only relates to bodies that the souls join to them and cannot relate to souls, because the souls are single and there is not any plurality in singles; the plurality is only due to the bodies in which the souls join them, but the truth It is that, divine jewelry should be Multiplied and distinct too, and the opposite will lead to impossible. The other reason for Avicenna for the occurrence is the belief in the negation of the’ principle of closure’ but, moreover, this principle is not acceptable, it does not essentially include immaterial world because it only relates to to the nature. Manuscript profile
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        3 - A Critical Evaluation of Ibn Sina’s Arguments on the Presential Perception of Essence
        somayyeh ajalli sahar kavandi
        According to Islamic philosophers, the soul’s self-perception is of the type of presential knowledge. In other words, the soul’s awareness of its own essence, unlike what Descartes states in his concept of Cogito, does not occur through external objects, body organs, or More
        According to Islamic philosophers, the soul’s self-perception is of the type of presential knowledge. In other words, the soul’s awareness of its own essence, unlike what Descartes states in his concept of Cogito, does not occur through external objects, body organs, or soulish acts. Rather, the soul perceives its self free from its acts and states and with no reliance on the activities of material body. The prominent Islamic philosopher, Ibn Sina, has posed different arguments in order to demonstrate this claim, the most important of which is the argument of “floating man” or “suspended man”. However, an evaluation of such arguments seems to reveal that they are not capable of demonstrating their claim and, under the best circumstances, they can merely prove the difference between the soul’s self-knowledge and its knowledge of other objects. Therefore, it seems that either more solid arguments are necessary to demonstrate the soul’s independence in self-perception or the soul should not be considered independent of the body and, particularly, the brain in this regard. Manuscript profile
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        4 - Editor's Notes
        Hossein  Kalbasi Ashtari
        Ibn Sina Cultural Heritage
        Ibn Sina Cultural Heritage Manuscript profile
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        5 - A Historical Study of the Theory of Induction
        Moosa Malayeri
        This study is intended to provide an answer to the following questions: Does induction generate certain knowledge or tentative conclusions? Is perfect induction possible or impossible? If it is impossible, could the addition of a supplement to imperfect induction result More
        This study is intended to provide an answer to the following questions: Does induction generate certain knowledge or tentative conclusions? Is perfect induction possible or impossible? If it is impossible, could the addition of a supplement to imperfect induction result in certain and absolute judgments? In order to provide some answers to the raised questions, the writer has explored the historical development of the theory of induction and then discussed the theory adopted in this paper. This theory has not undergone many fluctuations in the history of Muslim thinkers’ logical thoughts and can be studied in three historical phases or periods. In the first phase, the greatest player of which was Fārābī and, more than him, Ibn Sīnā, induction was divided into perfect and imperfect types. At the same time, Fārābī explicitly stated that perfect induction is impossible and emphasized that imperfect induction results in uncertain conclusions. In order to compensate for the defects of induction, Ibn Sīnā demonstrated how the conclusions of an imperfect induction can be promoted to the level of an empirical judgment through using a compound syllogism and benefitting from the chance principle so that it would turn into an ensuring and certain conclusion. The main player of the second period is Fakhr al-Dīn Rāzī. He maintained that imperfect induction does not yield certain results, and what has been interpreted as empirical judgment and placed within the category of certainties and even axioms is not anything more than an analogy. The third phase is characterized by the efforts and ideas of Muhammad Baqir Sadr, who believed that, although imperfect induction results in certain conclusions, the mentioned certainty, in contrast to Ibn Sīnā’s view, does not result from the mediation of a compound syllogism and the chance principle. He, rather, acknowledged that the certainty of inductive judgments arises from a specific feature of human intellect which persuades it to ignore fewer possible instances in the face of numerous possible ones. He calls this kind of certainty subjective certainty. The present paper, after reporting and analyzing the three- fold periods, demonstrates that the only defensible and justifiable standpoint regarding the theory of induction belongs to Fakhr al-Dīn Rāzī and concludes that induction, whether by itself or with the help of a syllogism, yields nothing more than a tentative conclusion. Manuscript profile
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        6 - Analytical Study of traversal and cutting movement in the View of Ibn Sina and Mulla Sadra
        Ahmad Shakibaie Mansur  Imanpour
        Ibn Sina's and Mulla Sadra's use of traversal & cutting movement led to ambiguity in the movement existance. In this research, in order to eliminate this ambiguity, we have addressed the following: One, Ibn Sina's arguments for introducing two definite meanings of motio More
        Ibn Sina's and Mulla Sadra's use of traversal & cutting movement led to ambiguity in the movement existance. In this research, in order to eliminate this ambiguity, we have addressed the following: One, Ibn Sina's arguments for introducing two definite meanings of motion, which are the responses to the bugs inflicted on the existence of motion and the reason for the very nature of motion; His arrangements have been explained in that they are the separation of the first perfection from the second, as well as the separation of the connection from the movement. After answering the problems raised by Ibn Sina's point of view it is clear that Mulla Sadra has succeeded in completing Ibn Sina's method by bringing forward the discussion of the Transcendent Philosophy, but Mulla Sadra has not explicitly proved the existence of a definite existence by justifying it on the basis of the principiality of existence Manuscript profile
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        7 - An Evaluation of Fakhr al-Dīn Rāzī’s Criticisms of Ibn Sīnā’s Argument Regarding the Finitude of Dimensions
        Mahmoud  Saidiy
        The finitude of dimensions is one of the oldest problems of natural philosophy, the consequences of which have entered the realm of divine philosophy. The question is whether the dimensions of the world and each natural body is finite and limited or infinite and limitle More
        The finitude of dimensions is one of the oldest problems of natural philosophy, the consequences of which have entered the realm of divine philosophy. The question is whether the dimensions of the world and each natural body is finite and limited or infinite and limitless. Aristotle was the first philosopher who studied this problem in the history of philosophy and ruled out the infinity of the dimensions of bodies and the natural world. In the same view, Ibn Sīnā maintained that the dimensions of body are finite and presented the three-fold arguments of correspondence, parallelism, and hierarchy in order to demonstrate this theory. Fakhr al-Dīn Rāzī, who is the most important critic of Ibn Sīnā in the history of philosophy, advanced some criticisms against this theory of Ibn Sīnā. This study proves that most of Fakhr al-Rāzī’s misconceptions in this regard originate in mixing the mind with the outside and the principles of the nine-fold categories with the category of quantity. Manuscript profile
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        8 - foreword
        Seyyed Mohammad Khamenei
        Ibn Sina culture
        Ibn Sina culture Manuscript profile
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        9 - An Evaluation of Fakhr al-Dīn Rāzī’s Criticisms of Ibn Sīnā’s Arguments on the Falsity of Vacuum
        Mahmud  Seidy
        One of the problems that has always been discussed during the history of Islamic philosophy is the possibility or impossibility of vacuum. The problem is whether one can imagine a place or space in which there is no body. Aristotle was one of the philosophers that criti More
        One of the problems that has always been discussed during the history of Islamic philosophy is the possibility or impossibility of vacuum. The problem is whether one can imagine a place or space in which there is no body. Aristotle was one of the philosophers that criticized the theory of vacuum and presented some arguments in this regard. Following Aristotle, Ibn Sīnā discussed this problem and provided some arguments in support of his views. These arguments have been adduced on the equality or sameness of the dimensions of vacuum, mobility of bodies in vacuum, forcible motion in open air, and non-temporality of physical motion in vacuum. Fakhr al-Dīn Rāzī has referred to several defects of these arguments, which are critically investigated in this paper. Manuscript profile
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        10 - Labyrinth of the World: Deconstruction of Nicolaus Cusanus’ Perception of Substance Based on the Views of Meister Eckhart and Ibn Sīnā
        Ebrahim  Ranjbar Mohammadreza Asadi
        Nicolaus Cusanus, the German Philosopher and theologian, tried to revise the metaphysical views of his time in his works. He tried to present his philosophical approach systematically by posing a number of innovative theories about creation, Man’s relationship with the More
        Nicolaus Cusanus, the German Philosopher and theologian, tried to revise the metaphysical views of his time in his works. He tried to present his philosophical approach systematically by posing a number of innovative theories about creation, Man’s relationship with the infinite affair, motion, and knowledge, as well as by revising the common religious views regarding such theorems as the first sin and creation out of nothing. Here, the authors have initially tried to examine Cusanus’ important views about the relationship between Man and the infinite affair, and through which reveal that, from this point of view, there is only one substance in the world, and anything other than that is among its necessary accidents. Next, they propound the concepts of unfolding and folding and introduce a category called the trans-substantial motion in Cusanus’ specific reading. After discussing his views, the background of the formation of his approach are deconstructed. In doing so, Meister Eckhart’s interpretation of some sections of the Holy Book and some of Ibn Sīnā’s fundamental metaphysical views are presented. Then the authors argue that Ibn Sīnā’s innovative approaches and Meister Eckhart’s novel interpretations pave the context for postulating a new metaphysics that is different from the traditional one. This can introduce new perspectives for philosophical studies and shed a new light on the history of philosophical thought. Manuscript profile
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        11 - Critical confrontations between Sinavi philosophy and Ash'ari philosophy in psychology and its effect on the issue of resurrection
        Narjes  Roudgar Zahra  Ziaie Fatemeh  Sharif Fakhr
        The purpose of this research is to examine the critical confrontations between Sinavi philosophy and Ash'ari philosophy in psychology and its effect on the position of each on the issue of resurrection. In order to defend the doctrine of incarnation, the Ash'ari theolog More
        The purpose of this research is to examine the critical confrontations between Sinavi philosophy and Ash'ari philosophy in psychology and its effect on the position of each on the issue of resurrection. In order to defend the doctrine of incarnation, the Ash'ari theologians established their theological eschatology by adopting the approach of physicality of the soul and matching it with the teachings of revelation. Ash'ari's view was criticized by Ibn Sina. Ibn Sina, by formulating a new nature of the science of soul in theology and natural sciences, achieved a new result in the unprovability of metaphysical rationality and the rational proof of metaspirituality. The present study, with descriptive and analytical method, in addition to reflecting the views of each, has dealt with Ibn Sina's critical encounter with Ash'ari in psychology and eschatology. Ibn Sina opened new horizons in philosophy by creating a logical relationship between intellectual achievements and the appearances of the holy Sharia.Acceptance of physical resurrection included in Sharia and proof of pure spiritual resurrection are among these cases. With the aim of harmonizing the theological foundations and the appearances of the Sharia, Ash'areh also took a similar path with Ibn Sina, which led to the proof of the resurrection. Finally, as a result of the theoretical frictions between Ash'ari and Ibn Sina, their different views on resurrection have been formed. Manuscript profile
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        12 - Comparison of the opinions of Ibn Sina and Ibn Arabi on the issue of free will and destiny
        Somayeh Heiran Abbas  Ahmadi Saiedi mohamad ali akhgar
        In this research, the issue of free will in humans and divine destiny in the views of Ibn Sina and Ibn Arabi are examined and then compared. The importance of the research is due to the distinction between Ibn Sina's philosophical approach and Ibn Arabi's mystical-theol More
        In this research, the issue of free will in humans and divine destiny in the views of Ibn Sina and Ibn Arabi are examined and then compared. The importance of the research is due to the distinction between Ibn Sina's philosophical approach and Ibn Arabi's mystical-theological approach to answer the question of free will in man and divine destiny, while both thinkers have the same procedure in explaining the issue of Qada, Qadr and free will in the philosophical discussion or There are mystics of unity. The most important similarity between the views of these two thinkers is in considering the will in humans as non-inherent, which they see in the light of God's innate will. The most important difference between Ibn Arabi's and Ibn Sina's opinions regarding divine judgment and destiny is Ibn Sina's reliance and emphasis on the knowledge of God's mercy and Ibn Arabi's emphasis on divine judgment. This difference is rooted in Ibn Sina's philosophical approach and Ibn Arabi's mystical-theological approach to analyze the subject. Regarding free will in man, Ibn Sina believes that by performing certain actions, a person has the ability to exercise his opinion and change his destiny, and God has decreed such that there is certainty and certainty in man's actions, and that judgment is based on his free will and will. And the divine decree has determined the free will in the actions of humans. According to Ibn Arabi, the judgment and fate of God's decree is in the order of fixed nobles and their requirements, and therefore the will and free will of man are also in their domain. And Qada and Qadr do not violate human free will. The method of this research is based on descriptive-analytical and using library texts. Manuscript profile