List of Articles فخررازي

• Open Access Article
  • Abstract Page
  • Full-Text
  
  1 - An Evaluation of Fakhr al-Din Razi’s Criticisms of Ibn Sina’s Definition of Time
  Mahmoud  Saidiy Seyyed Mohammad  Musawy
  Following Aristotle, Ibn Sina maintained that time is the number of motion which is attained by the continuous movement of a moving agent over a distance. He adduced two arguments in order to demonstrate his theory: one was based on the difference between the motions of More

  Following Aristotle, Ibn Sina maintained that time is the number of motion which is attained by the continuous movement of a moving agent over a distance. He adduced two arguments in order to demonstrate his theory: one was based on the difference between the motions of moving things in terms of speed, and the other was based on the divisibility of the distance of movement. In contrast, through advancing various objections, Fakhr al-Din Razi challenged this theory not only with regard to its two underlying arguments but also with respect to the theory of time being the number of motion. The present paper aims to demonstrate that Fakhr al-Din Razi’s criticisms originate in his lack of enough scrutiny of Ibn Sina’s principles, particularly regarding the opposition of non-existence and habit between motion and rest, time as necessary by the other and not necessary by itself, the difference between universal and particular times of each motion, and the existence of logical fallacy in some arguments. However, the final response to some of his criticisms are given based on the principles of the Transcendent Philosophy regarding the analytic differences between motion, time, and time as the fourth dimension of being. Manuscript profile
• Open Access Article
  • Abstract Page
  • Full-Text
  
  2 - A Comparative Judgement of the Views and Principles of Mullā Ṣadrā and Fakhr al-Dīn Rāzī on the Problem of Corporeal Resurrection
  Seyyed Ali  Razizadeh Seyyed Abbas Zahabi
  Both Fakhr al-Dīn Rāzī and Mullā Ṣadrā believe in corporeal resurrection; however, they follow different approaches in this regard. A comparison of their views shows similarities in some of their principles but fundamental differences in some others. The origin of their More

  Both Fakhr al-Dīn Rāzī and Mullā Ṣadrā believe in corporeal resurrection; however, they follow different approaches in this regard. A comparison of their views shows similarities in some of their principles but fundamental differences in some others. The origin of their difference is their philosophical principles and, particularly, the discussions of “identical restoration of the non-existent” and “immateriality of faculties”. The rational demonstration of Fakhr al-Dīn Rāzī’s corporeal resurrection was based on his belief in identity with the identical restoration of the non-existent, which has led to some incorrect conclusions such as the materiality of the immaterial dimensions of the soul in the process of resurrection. On the other hand, in contrast to Fakhr al-Dīn Rāzī’s claim as to philosophers’ lack of belief in corporeal resurrection, Mullā Ṣadrā tried to prove it philosophically for the first time. Although his philosophical approach gave rise to some criticisms against him, the same approach was the secret behind his immunity against repeating the same mistakes committed by mutikallimun, including Fakhr al-Dīn Rāzī. Mullā Ṣadrā rejected the theory of the restoration of the non-existent and believed in other worldly and not elemental corporeal resurrection. Therefore, to demonstrate the restoration of individuals’ acts, he did not have to resort to mutikallimun’s theory of the “return of dispersed components” of human beings. One of the other differences between the views of these two philosophers concerns the problem of the multiplicity and immateriality of faculties. Both thinkers believed in the immateriality of the soul, but Fakhr al-Dīn Rāzī maintained that soulish faculties lack multiplicity and tried to bring it in line with the idea of the identical restoration of the non-existent. However, Mullā Ṣadrā believed that the solution to the problem of corporeal resurrection, similar to many other problems, must be sought in the specific method of the soul’s knowledge, particularly, the immateriality of imagination. This paper aims to explain and evaluate the fundamental differences between the views of Fakhr al-Dīn Rāzī and Mullā Ṣadrā regarding the problem of corporeal resurrection. Manuscript profile