List of Articles تجرد نفس

• Open Access Article
  • Abstract Page
  • Full-Text
  
  1 - Shared Model of the Body-Centered Arguments of the Immateriality of the Soul in Ibn Sina and Mulla Sadra
  Majid  Yaryan Furugh al-Sadat  Rahimpoor Mehdi Emam Jome
  Some Islamic philosophers, such as Ibn Sina and Mulla Sadra, have dealt with the characteristics of the soul, including the demonstration of its immateriality, in their anthropological discussions. A study of the works of these two philosophers indicates that the positi More

  Some Islamic philosophers, such as Ibn Sina and Mulla Sadra, have dealt with the characteristics of the soul, including the demonstration of its immateriality, in their anthropological discussions. A study of the works of these two philosophers indicates that the positive arguments of the immateriality of the soul are all based on the negation of the characteristics of the body and bodily matter. In other words, they denote that the soul lacks bodily features and, hence, demonstrates that it is immaterial. For example, bodily matter enjoys quantity, position, change, divisibility, and finitude of acts; it is vulnerable to weakness, aging, and tiredness. Moreover, the knowledge of the body and its acts is of the acquired type and is conditioned by place and position. These two philosophers demonstrate the immateriality of the soul by negating and denying the above characteristics to it. Thus the knowledge of the soul and demonstration of its immaterial nature would be impossible without the knowledge of the body and disallowing any bodily features for it. In this paper, in addition to revising the arguments of the demonstration of the immateriality of the soul and determining the key place of the body therein, it has been tried to design and provide a general model entailing all such arguments. Manuscript profile
• Open Access Article
  • Abstract Page
  • Full-Text
  
  2 - A Critical Study of Functionalism with a Glance at Mulla Sadra’s Self-Knowledge
  Reza  Safari Kandsari
  The relationship between the body and the soul is one of the complex issues in philosophy. The Cartesian and Platonic dualism is one of the solutions offered for this problem. Descartes and Plato believed that the soul and body are two different substances and enjoy the More

  The relationship between the body and the soul is one of the complex issues in philosophy. The Cartesian and Platonic dualism is one of the solutions offered for this problem. Descartes and Plato believed that the soul and body are two different substances and enjoy their own particular domains and features. Contemporary philosophers of the mind have also introduced a number of views in order to resolve the problems of substantial dualism. The theories of behaviorism and the identity of the mind and body deny the substantive nature of the soul and employ the words “mind” and “mental states” instead of the word “soul” and maintain that mental states are the same behavioral and brain-related states. However, while acknowledging the problems of dualism, the behavioral approaches, and the standpoint of the identity of the mind and brain, the advocates of functionalism provide an impartial interpretation of the mind (its being abstract or concrete) and believe that mental states are the same functional states which perform certain functional roles based on mental input and output and other mental states. Islamic philosophers and mutikallimun have also tackled the enigma of the soul and body and Plato’s substantial dualism. Ibn Sina and Suhrawardi deny the priority of the soul to the body (Platonic theory) but consider the essence of the soul and body to be immaterial and corporeal, respectively. Most mutikallimun reject the idea of the soul as an immaterial and self-subsistent substance and view it as a delicate kind of body. In line with functionalists, Mulla Sadra was well aware of the problems associated with considering the soul as an immaterial or corporeal substance and argued that the essence of the soul is not purely immaterial or material; rather, it is initially corporeal and then becomes immaterial through trans-substantial motion. He also stated that, based on the shadowy true unity, the soul is an intermediate world inclusive of both materiality and immateriality and becomes material and immaterial based on the states of its grades. Although both functionalists and Mulla Sadra reject the mind’s (the soul in Mulla Sadra’s view) being purely immaterial or corporeal, Mulla Sadra provided a more accurate explanation of the body-soul relation in comparison to functionalists, who hold a physicalist view of the mind. This is because he does not limit being exclusively to nature. Manuscript profile
• Open Access Article
  • Abstract Page
  • Full-Text
  
  3 - A Comparison of the Body-Soul Relationship in Philosophical Behaviorism and Sadrian Philosophy
  Naeimeh  Najmi Nejad Morteza Rezaee
  The discussion of the relationship between the soul and body has always been a challenging problem. The most important problem with this discussion is the quality of the relationship between the soul as an immaterial existence with the body as a material existence. Many More

  The discussion of the relationship between the soul and body has always been a challenging problem. The most important problem with this discussion is the quality of the relationship between the soul as an immaterial existence with the body as a material existence. Many thinkers have presented some theories in response to this problem. Following a descriptive-analytic approach, the present study examines and compares behaviorism, which provides some of the important theories in the philosophy of the mind, with the view of Mullā Ṣadrā as the most prominent Islamic Philosopher. The findings of the study indicate that both behaviorist and Mullā Ṣadrā believe in the oneness of the soul and body. However, behaviorists conceive of the soul and mental states as nothing but external human behavior. This approach in fact rejects the immateriality of the soul and its mental states, while Mullā Ṣadrā considers the relationship between the body and the soul as integration through unification based on some of his own principles including the graded trans-substantial motion and the soul’s corporeal origination. In his view, the soul, while being a single substance, enjoys both a material and corporeal level and different levels of immateriality – including Ideal and rational types – because of its graded nature. In other words, there is a single conjunctive truth that appears in the form of the body at lower levels and as the soul at higher levels. Manuscript profile
• Open Access Article
  • Abstract Page
  • Full-Text
  
  4 - Effects of the Views of Ibn Sīnā and Fakhr al-Dīn Rāzī on Mullā Ṣadrā’s Theory of the Immateriality of the Soul
  Davood  Mohamadiany
  The immateriality of the soul has always been one of the important psychological discussions in Islamic philosophy and given rise to various related theories. Mullā Ṣadrā has discussed the problem more than any other philosopher and claims to have some innovative views More

  The immateriality of the soul has always been one of the important psychological discussions in Islamic philosophy and given rise to various related theories. Mullā Ṣadrā has discussed the problem more than any other philosopher and claims to have some innovative views regarding the imaginal immateriality of the soul. Here, the author intends to criticize Mullā Ṣadrā’s view based on a study of the views of Ibn Sīnā and Fakhr al-Dīn Rāzī. Mullā Ṣadrā claims that he is the first to have provided a theory on the immateriality of the soul; however, a study of the works of Ibn Sīnā and Fakhr al-Dīn Rāzī reveals that this theory has indeed a longer history than what Mullā Ṣadrā attests. Ibn Sīnā’s words on the demonstration of the immateriality of the soul are quite clear; nevertheless, they raise some doubt concerning the imaginal immateriality of the soul. Ibn Sīnā and Mullā Ṣadrā adduce two different reasons to prove this immateriality. However, Mullā Ṣadrā has also demonstrated imaginal and super rational immateriality of the soul and rejected some of Ibn Sīnā’s reasons about the immateriality of the soul. The present paper criticizes Mullā Ṣadrā’s view and approach in this regard. Manuscript profile
• Open Access Article
  • Abstract Page
  • Full-Text
  
  5 - The Nature and Eternity of Human Soul in Descartes
  Asieh  Bistooni Mohammad Akvan Mahdi Najafi Afra
  <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent: 1.0cm; line-height: 130%;"><span style="mso-ascii-font-family: 'Times New Roman'; mso-ascii-theme-font: major-bidi; mso-hansi-font-family: 'Times New Roman'; mso-hansi-theme-font: major-bidi; mso-bidi-font-family: 'Times New Roma More

  <p class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent: 1.0cm; line-height: 130%;"><span style="mso-ascii-font-family: 'Times New Roman'; mso-ascii-theme-font: major-bidi; mso-hansi-font-family: 'Times New Roman'; mso-hansi-theme-font: major-bidi; mso-bidi-font-family: 'Times New Roman'; mso-bidi-theme-font: major-bidi;">The soul is one of the most frequently used terms in Descartes&rsquo; philosophical works and one of the fundamental concepts employed in the structure of his philosophy. In fact, without considering the meaning and concept of the soul, one cannot perceive the essence of his philosophical system. He views the soul as an immaterial substance that is different from the body in the real sense of the word and can exist without the body. Descartes maintains that the soul is an essentially immaterial and decomposable substance that, after its destruction or the postmortem decomposition of the body, continues its life in the light of its essential immateriality bearing the memory of its union with the body. He has posed certain arguments on the immaterial nature of the human soul, such as the possibility of doubting the existence of bodies, the needlessness of the concept of the soul from corporal attributes, God&rsquo;s power as to creating two elements with each one being clearly and distinctly perceivable, and the oneness and indecomposability of the soul. Accordingly, he believes in three substances of God, soul, and body in distinction from each other. He intends a true distinction when he refers to distinction of substances; however, this reference has become problematic for him, and he must clarify how two truly distinct substances can affect each other in unison. He has tried to resolve this problem by placing the vapor soul, the &ldquo;pineal gland&rdquo;, and the faculty of imagination as intermediaries or by establishing a kind of balance or even substantial unity between them. Nevertheless, the more he has tried to resolve the problem, the more he has been challenged. He has also presented two completely different standpoints regarding the eternity of the soul, which must be demonstrated based on rational and philosophical arguments. However, in his second stance, he introduces the mortality of the soul as a completely religious category and states that the eternity of the soul cannot be realized merely within the framework of the natural intellect and without seeking help from faith. Descartes has also been unsuccessful in this regard and failed to prove his claim. </span></p> Manuscript profile