بازتاب شناختی و باورهای توطئه ویروس کرونا
الموضوعات :هاشم صادقیه 1 , ایمان خان احمدی 2 , پروانه فرهاد بیگی 3 , نگار کریمی 4 , نیما گنجی 5
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الکلمات المفتاحية: بازتاب شناختی, سبک شهودی, تحلیلی, نظریه توطئه, اطلاعات غلط, ویروس کرونا, کووید-19,
ملخص المقالة :
مقدمه: در دوران شیوع بیماری کووید-19 سرعت گسترش باورهای توطئه و پیامدهای خطرناک آن به ما یادآوری شد. یک سؤال مهم این است که چه ویژگی‌هایی می‌تواند باورپذیری نظریه‌های توطئه را پیش‌بینی کند. مطالعات گذشته به یکی از این صفات اشاره داشته است: سبک‌شناختی تحلیلی (بازتاب شناختی) در مقابل شهودی. روش: در این مطالعه چگونگی ارتباط سبک شناختی با باورهای معتبر یا بی‌اساس در مورد منشأ کووید-19 بررسی‌شده است. 173 نفر احتمال باورهای مختلف در مورد منشأ ویروس جدید کرونا را نمره‌گذاری کردند و به آزمون بازتاب شناختی نسخه اصلی پاسخ دادند. یافته‌ها: در راستای مطالعات پیشین، پاسخ‌های بازتابی با باورهای توطئه همبستگی منفی و با باور معتبر (که ویروس از دنیای وحش به‌طور تصادفی منتشرشده است) همبستگی مثبت دارد. الگوی معکوسی در پاسخ‌های شهودی دیده شد. نتیجه‌گیری: نتایج حاضر شواهد بیشتری را در راستای حمایت از رابطه میان سبک تحلیلی تفکر و تمایل به رد باورهای توطئه فراهم آورده است.
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