تضمنات سیاسی نظریۀ صدق در اندیشۀ «ریچارد رورتی»
محورهای موضوعی : پژوهش سیاست نظری
سمیرا غلامی
1
,
محمد مهدی مجاهدی
2
,
مجید توسلی رکن آبادی
3
,
ایرج رنجبر
4
1 - دانشجوی دکتری، گروه علوم سیاسی، واحد علوم و تحقیقات، دانشکده حقوق، الهیات و علوم سیاسی، دانشگاه آزاد اسلامی، تهران، ایران
2 - استادیار گروه پژوهشی مطالعات بین¬رشته¬ای، پژوهشکده دانشنامه¬نگاری، پژوهشگاه علوم انسانی و مطالعات فرهنگی، تهران، ایران
3 - استاد علوم سیاسی، واحد علوم و تحقیقات، دانشکده حقوق، الهیات و علوم سیاسی، دانشگاه آزاد اسلامی، تهران، ایران
4 - استادیار گروه علوم سیاسی، واحد کرمانشاه، دانشکده حقوق و علوم سیاسی، دانشگاه آزاد اسلامی، کرمانشاه، ایران
کلید واژه: نظریۀ صدق, عمل‌گرایی, دموکراسی بورژوازی, چرخش زبانی و حقیقتِ برساخته.,
چکیده مقاله :
نظریۀ صدق در سنت فلسفۀ غرب، غالباً بر الگوی «مطابقت» استوار بوده است؛ الگویی که صدق را در کشف و انطباق با واقعیتی بنیادین، فراتاریخی و مستقل از ذهن و زبان می‌جوید و از همین‌رو، میتواند متضمن سیاستی حقیقت‌محور و مبتنی بر مرجعیت‌های عینی و فرابشری باشد. رورتی با نقد این تلقی، صدق را نه بازنماییِ واقعیتی غایی، بلکه حاصل توافق زبانی، عادت‌های اجتماعی و سودمندی عملی در درون جماعت‌های انسانی می‌داند. این مقاله با رویکردی فرانظری و روشی توصیفی- تحلیلی، تضمنات سیاسیِ این جابه‌جایی از «صدق مطابقتی» به «صدق پراگماتیستی» را بررسی نموده و به این یافته منتج شده که نظریۀ صدق رورتی با نفی دموکراسی لیبرالِ فلسفی، به «دموکراسی لیبرال بورژوایی» راه می‌برد؛ دموکراسی‌ای که بینیاز از بنیادهای متافیزیکی، بر همبستگی، گفت‌وگو و پیشامدی‌بودن باورها تکیه می‌کند. بدینسان پیامد چنین دریافتی میتواند، نقد ایدئولوژی‌های حقیقت‌مدار، تقویت پلورالیسم سیاسی، پذیرش تکثر فرهنگی، کاهش خودسانسوری ایدئولوژیک و پرورش شهروندانی آیرونیک باشد که باورهای خویش را پیوسته بازاندیشی می‌کنند.
The Political Implications of the Theory
of Truth in Richard Rorty’s Thought
Samira Gholami*
Mohammad Mahdi Mojahedi**
Majid Tavassoli Roknabadi***
Iraj Ranjbar****
In the Western philosophical tradition, the theory of truth has predominantly been based on the “correspondence” model a model that seeks truth in the discovery of and adaptation to a fundamental, transhistorical, and mind-independent reality. Consequently, this model can imply a truth-centered politics based on objective and transcendent authorities. Rorty criticizes this view, arguing that truth is not a representation of an ultimate reality, but the result of linguistic consensus, social habits, and practical utility within human communities. This article, utilizing a meta-theoretical approach and a descriptive-analytical method, examines the political implications of this shift from “correspondence truth” to “pragmatic truth.” It concludes that Rorty’s theory of truth, by rejecting philosophical liberal democracy, points toward “bourgeois liberal democracy” a democracy that, being free from metaphysical foundations, relies on solidarity, dialogue, and the contingency of beliefs. Thus, the consequence of such a conception can be the critique of truth-oriented ideologies, the strengthening of political pluralism, the acceptance of cultural diversity, the reduction of ideological self-censorship, and the cultivation of “ironic” citizens who continuously rethink their own beliefs.
Keywords: Theory of Truth, Pragmatism, Bourgeois Democracy, Linguistic Turn, Constructed Truth.
Introduction
Richard Rorty is one of the most prominent figures of contemporary pragmatism who, by criticizing the tradition of modern epistemology particularly foundationalism and representationism rethinks the prevailing understanding of truth and knowledge. In the Western philosophical tradition, it has often been assumed that there exists an objective reality independent of the mind, and that the human mind can reflect it representationally in the form of true propositions. Rorty calls this view, rooted in the Cartesian and Kantian tradition, the “mirror of nature” (the mirror-like theory of knowledge), and believes that this approach has driven philosophy toward a search for metaphysical foundations of truth. Inspired by the tradition of pragmatism and influenced by thinkers such as Wittgenstein, Sellars, and Davidson, Rorty argues that human knowledge is formed within the context of language and social interaction. Accordingly, truth is not the correspondence of a proposition with an independent reality, but a concept that finds meaning within the framework of vocabularies and social agreements. This conception of truth has implications beyond epistemology and leads to a rethinking of political concepts. Therefore, examining the political implications of the theory of truth in Rorty’s thought and explaining the relationship between his epistemological critique and a specific understanding of democracy constitutes the main problem of this article.
Literature Review
Studies related to Rorty’s thought can be divided into three main categories:
Epistemological Critique: Research focusing on Rorty’s critique of traditional epistemology and correspondence theories of truth, emphasizing concepts such as anti-foundationalism, the role of language in constructing meaning, and the contingency of truth. While these works have clarified the theoretical foundations of Rorty’s thought, they often remain at the level of epistemological analysis.
Metaphysical Critique: Studies that have addressed the critique of metaphysics and the rejection of absolute truth, interpreting truth as dependent on dialogue and social consensus, without systematically examining the political implications of this view.
Political Philosophy: Studies that focus directly on Rorty’s political philosophy, particularly debates concerning liberal democracy, irony, and pluralism, but which often neglect the theoretical link between these topics and his conception of truth.
The main gap in the existing literature is the absence of an analysis that directly links Rorty’s theory of truth to its political implications a gap that the present research aims to fill.
Theoretical Framework
The theoretical framework of this research is based on Rorty’s neopragmatic reading of truth and knowledge. By rejecting foundationalism and representationism, Rorty argues that human knowledge is not a reflection of objective reality but a product of linguistic and social interactions. In this framework, the value of beliefs is measured not based on their correspondence with a supra-linguistic truth, but based on their effectiveness in solving problems and advancing dialogue. This view is linked to the “linguistic turn” in contemporary philosophy, according to which meaning and truth are shaped within linguistic games and historical contexts. For Rorty, beliefs and values are contingent and historical, and there is no fixed metaphysical foundation for them. Thus, instead of seeking definitive foundations for truth, philosophy should serve to strengthen dialogue and social solidarity.
Research Methodology
This research is qualitative and conducted using a descriptive-analytical method. In this framework, Richard Rorty’s primary works on truth, knowledge, and democracy have been directly studied, and key concepts related to the theory of truth have been extracted and analyzed. Subsequently, through argumentative reconstruction, the relationship between Rorty’s conception of truth and its political implications has been examined.
Findings and Discussion
Analysis of Rorty’s works shows that his critique of the correspondence theory of truth has significant implications for understanding politics. Rorty views truth as a pragmatic concept formed in the context of linguistic and social interactions, where the criterion for evaluating beliefs is their utility in solving problems and strengthening social cooperation. Consequently, truth no longer provides a metaphysical foundation for political legitimacy. Accordingly, Rorty defends a type of democracy whose legitimacy derives not from universal principles, but from practical functions and its ability to foster social solidarity. In this framework, values such as freedom and equality are historical constructs that are stabilized through dialogue and social consensus. Furthermore, Rorty’s emphasis on “irony” and the contingency of beliefs leads to an attitude that encourages citizens to constantly rethink their own beliefs and accept value pluralism.
Conclusion
The present research has shown that the theory of truth in Rorty’s thought, by rejecting the metaphysical foundations of truth, transforms truth into a linguistic and social concept. This epistemological shift has significant political implications and leads to the defense of a type of liberal democracy based on dialogue and social solidarity. In this framework, the legitimacy of the political order derives not from transhistorical truths, but from practical effectiveness and its ability to manage social plurality. Thus, Rorty’s approach, by distancing itself from ideologies based on absolute truth, provides the possibility of formulating a democratic politics based on the acceptance of plurality, dialogue, and the continuous critique of beliefs.
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* Ph.D. Student, Department of Political Science, SR.C., Islamic Azad University, Tehran, Iran.
s.gholami7270@iau.ac.ir
https: //orcid.org/0000-0001-6611-7066
** Corresponding Author: Assistant Professor, Interdisciplinary Studies Research Group, Encyclopedia Compilation Institute, Research Institute for Humanities and Cultural Studies, Tehran, Iran.
https: //orcid.org/0000-0002-5819-2573
*** Professor, Department of Political Science, SR.C., Islamic Azad University, Tehran, Iran.
https: //orcid.org/0000-0002-7746-364x
**** Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, Ker.C., Islamic Azad University, Kermanshah, Iran.
https: //orcid.org/0000-0002-5183-5054
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