List of Articles Quiddity

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  1 - Historical Development and Pre-Suppositions of the Theory of the Principiality of Existence in Tusi’s Analysis
  Hashem  Ghorbani
  The theory of the principiality of existence or quiddity lacks a systematic model in pre-Sadrian thoughts; however, it is based on certain presuppositions the discovery of which can illuminate Muslim thinkers’ approach to this problem. Khwajah Nasir al-Din Tusi has expl More

  The theory of the principiality of existence or quiddity lacks a systematic model in pre-Sadrian thoughts; however, it is based on certain presuppositions the discovery of which can illuminate Muslim thinkers’ approach to this problem. Khwajah Nasir al-Din Tusi has explained his epistemological ideas regarding these presuppositions. This paper deals with some of the presuppositions underlying the principiality of existence or quiddity as presented by Tusi. Some of them are as follows: 1) the problem of the addition of existence and quiddity and its quality; 2) detecting the relationship between existence and quiddity; 3) the mind or the outside as the place of the realization of this relationship, and 4) evaluating the referents of the mentioned analysis and the realization of quiddity and existence in the outside or emphasizing the exclusive realization of one of them. Through his analyses of each of these presuppositions, Tusi adopts an approach which can represent his agreement or disagreement with the principiality of existence. Accordingly, although the theory of the principiality of existence did not occupy his mind as a problem, his epistemological presuppositions regarding existence and quiddity are consistent with it. The development of the relationship between the ideas of Tusi and Mulla Sadra can be analyzed through explaining the former’s standpoints regarding the above-mentioned presuppositions and his influence over Mulla Sadra. Manuscript profile
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  2 - Suhrawardi’s Background in Advocating Mentally-Positedness of Existence
  Mahmoud  Hedayatafza Zeynab  Bostani
  Suhrawardi explicitly confirmed the “mentally-positedness of existence” in his most important works. He had correctly concluded the “external occurrence of existence to quiddity” from the works of Farabi and Ibn Sina and, while criticizing some of Ibn Sina’s words, had More

  Suhrawardi explicitly confirmed the “mentally-positedness of existence” in his most important works. He had correctly concluded the “external occurrence of existence to quiddity” from the works of Farabi and Ibn Sina and, while criticizing some of Ibn Sina’s words, had adduced several arguments for his own view. However, some contemporary scholars, when analyzing his standpoints, have ignored his background regarding the mentally-positedness of existence and introduced him as the first person who advocated this view. In the present paper, after a brief account of Farabi’s and Ibn Sina’s arguments concerning the relationship between existence and quiddity in possible things, the authors have analyzed Suhrawardi’s critical approach to this issue and then referred to three different sources for his belief in the mentally-positedness of existence. His hidden sources in this regard consist of some of the words of Bahmanyar and Omar Khayyam which he has quoted without citing the names of these two scholars in order to support his own arguments for the mentally-positedness of existence. His obvious source is a text written by Ibn Sahlan Sawi in al-Mashari’ wa’l-mutarihat. Since the philosophy section of Hakim Sawi’s book is not available, one cannot correctly judge the quality and quantity of the influence of above-mentioned thinkers on Suhrawardi. Nevertheless, available evidence demonstrates the certainty of his frequent adaptations of Bahmanyar’s works on the rejection of the “external objectivity of existence”. Manuscript profile
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  3 - On the Translation of Aristotle’s Ousia as Substance
  Hamid Khosravani Hamidreza  Mahboobi Arani Seyyed Mohammad Ali Hodjati
  Aristotle’s discussion of the Ousia are diverse and confusing since there are various definition of the term especially in Metaphysics, Physics and Categories. He refers to it sometimes as the underlying layer, sometimes he means something similar to the meaning of bein More

  Aristotle’s discussion of the Ousia are diverse and confusing since there are various definition of the term especially in Metaphysics, Physics and Categories. He refers to it sometimes as the underlying layer, sometimes he means something similar to the meaning of being, and sometimes as essence and quiddity. Hence, the difficulty and disagreement among the translators and interpreters on the best equivalent for Ousia in other languages. In the present paper, after a short historical discussion about Ousia, I examine some common equivalents for the Ousia in Latin and English and attempt to discuss the different reasons for and against each equivalent. My argument, in general, goes for the term Substance, and I will bring 8 reasons to establish the argument. Manuscript profile
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  4 - Principiality of Existence and Change in the Logic of Definition
  Musa  Malayeri
  One of the main concerns of Aristotelian logic is to find a way for defining quiddities in order to attain a conceptual knowledge of them. Aristotle founded his system of logic of definition in harmony with his own worldview. In this system, true definitions were divide More

  One of the main concerns of Aristotelian logic is to find a way for defining quiddities in order to attain a conceptual knowledge of them. Aristotle founded his system of logic of definition in harmony with his own worldview. In this system, true definitions were divided into term and description. After Aristotle, the logic of definition was accepted by philosophers and logicians in its same primary form for a long period. Muslim Peripatetics followed almost the same trend until, in the course of the development of philosophy in the Islamic world, Mulla Sadra established the School of the Transcendent Philosophy through explaining and demonstrating the principiality of existence as well as developing some other ontological principles. One of the specific features of the Transcendent Philosophy was to harshly challenge the ontological bases of the logic of definition. Based on the theory of the principiality of existence, quiddities which, according to early philosophers, represent the objective reality of things, are reduced to mental concepts, and existence, which is the objective reality of things, cannot be perceived unless through direct observation. On the other hand, in this system, differentia, which is the basis of each quiddity and is considered to be the whole truth and actuality of each object, is not a quiddative thing and cannot be known through quiddative concepts. In this way, the basis of the five universals as the underlying foundation of the logic of definition became unstable. Following such changes, we expect to witness a fundamental review of Aristotelian logic and, particularly, of the concept of definition therein. The outcome of this overall change would be nothing but attaching more importance to the conceptual definition of truths, which is one of the significant consequences of the theory of the principiality of existence. Manuscript profile
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  5 - A Study of Mulla Sadra’s Ultimate View of the Meaning of the “Mentally-Positedness of Quiddity”
  Seyyed Shahriyar  Kamali Sabziwari
  In Mulla Sadra’s works, two different meanings are provided for the “mentally-positedness of quiddity”. In the first one, it means the subordinate realization of quiddity through existence. However, in the second one, it means the mental and virtual existence of quiddit More

  In Mulla Sadra’s works, two different meanings are provided for the “mentally-positedness of quiddity”. In the first one, it means the subordinate realization of quiddity through existence. However, in the second one, it means the mental and virtual existence of quiddity in the outside. In this paper, the author suggests three hypotheses as potential strategies in order to attain Mulla Sadra’s ultimate view regarding the meaning of “mentally-positedness of quiddity”. Finally, through the confirmation of the third hypothesis, he concludes that the first meaning of this concept is not acceptable because of its rational defects and argues that only the second meaning can be considered as the one intended in the Transcendent Philosophy. Manuscript profile
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  6 - Range of the Interpretations of Quiddative Concepts Based on the Principiality of Existence in the View of Contemporary Commentators of Sadrian Wisdom
  Rohollah Adineh Roghayeh Mosavi
  The principiality of existence and mentally-positedness of quiddity are the main bases of Mullā Ṣadrā’s philosophy and his particular theories. On the other hand, he has not provided a clear and accurate picture of these two theories in his philosophical system and has More

  The principiality of existence and mentally-positedness of quiddity are the main bases of Mullā Ṣadrā’s philosophy and his particular theories. On the other hand, he has not provided a clear and accurate picture of these two theories in his philosophical system and has referred to quiddity using different terms. Each of the contemporary commentators of the Transcendent Philosophy have interpreted quiddity and existence in a way based on their own views and theoretical principles and have tried to predicate it on Mullā Ṣadrā’s theory. However, given the fundamental role of quiddity and quiddative concepts in gaining acquired knowledge, disagreement in the interpretation of quiddity will affect the quality of explaining acquired knowledge. Hence, following a descriptive-analytic method, the present study aims to provide a correct interpretation for quiddity from the viewpoint of contemporary commentators of Sadrian philosophy and, then, investigate whether our acquired knowledge of existents, which is attained through quiddative concepts, is positive or negative. Accordingly, the authors have examined and criticized such commentators’ interpretations of quiddity and the way it explains existence. A short answer here is that, apparently, based on the correct view, which belongs to Professor Javadi Amuli, quiddity is the manifestation of determined existence, and quiddative concepts speak of limited existence, which is clearly a positive rather than a negative and purifying statement. Manuscript profile
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  7 - A Review of Mullā Ṣadrā’s Responses to the Problem of the Necessity of Subsuming One Quiddity into two Categories in the Discussion of Mental Existence
  Mohammad Hadi  Tavakkoli
  Based on the theory of the qualitative nature of knowledge and the identity of mental and objective quiddities, the acceptance of the theory of mental existence poses the problem of the necessity of the inclusion of knowledge in two categories. In his works, Mullā Ṣadrā More

  Based on the theory of the qualitative nature of knowledge and the identity of mental and objective quiddities, the acceptance of the theory of mental existence poses the problem of the necessity of the inclusion of knowledge in two categories. In his works, Mullā Ṣadrā has tried to solve this problem through distinguishing between common and primary predications, application of two categories to knowledge from two essential and accidental aspects, negation of the subsistence of inherence, and acceptance of the application of two categories to cognitive form due to the mentally-positedness of quiddity, and the possibility of its shadow-like realization in the form of multiple existences. Although a study of his responses indicate their incompleteness in resolving the issue, his principles have paved the ground for accomplishing this task through accepting the “predication of the indicator on the indicated”. According to this view, regardless of what the nature and category of the cognitive form is, the narration of the nature of an external thing is introduced as the ontological attribute of the cognitive form, which has nothing to do with its nature and is, rather, outside the realm of categories. Through this solution, we can both maintain the correspondence between the cognitive form and the nature of the external thing and, while accepting the realization of the cognitive form in the mind, resolve the problem of the necessity of the inclusion of knowledge in two categories. Manuscript profile
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  8 - A Critical Study of Suhrawardī’s Method of Defining Things
  Mohammad Hosseinzadeh
  Suhrawardī has leveled five criticisms in order to demonstrate the inefficiency of the Peripatetic theory of definition and, in return, has suggested another method for defining things. This method, which is known as the “conceptual definition”, is based on a common sen More

  Suhrawardī has leveled five criticisms in order to demonstrate the inefficiency of the Peripatetic theory of definition and, in return, has suggested another method for defining things. This method, which is known as the “conceptual definition”, is based on a common sense understanding of the meanings of words. According to this method, words are defined through providing their conceptual bases in the view of linguists or the people of language. Here, the author firstly explains Suhrawardī’s method of defining things and then examines it critically. The critical analysis of his view reveals that the logical conclusion of his criticism of the Peripatetic theory of definition is the correction of this theory through employing intuition rather than leaving the definition of things based on their quiddity aside and advocating the theory of conceptual definition. Moreover, Suhrawardī’s theory of definition, as a replacement for its Peripatetic counterpart, suffers from several problems. Therefore, even if Suhrawardī’s objections to the Peripatetics’ theory of definition are accepted, his own method in this regard is not acceptable by itself. At the end of this paper, the author explains and criticizes the views of a contemporary researcher of Suhrawardī’s ideas who believes that the relationship between Ibn Sīnā’s and Suhrawardī’s logic of definition is one of completion rather than difference. Manuscript profile
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  9 - Problem of Attributing Quiddity to Existence in Seyyed Ṣadr al-Dīn Dashtakī and an Evaluation of Mullā Ṣadrā’s Narration of his Views
  Seyyed Ahmad  Hosseini Sangchal
  Solving the problem of attributing quiddity to existence in Dashtakī’s view is intertwined with the theory of predication, derivative, and the principle of subordination. Through separating existence in the sense of being in existence and existence in the sense of exist More

  Solving the problem of attributing quiddity to existence in Dashtakī’s view is intertwined with the theory of predication, derivative, and the principle of subordination. Through separating existence in the sense of being in existence and existence in the sense of existent and distinguishing accidents by-themselves from mentally-posited accidents, Dashtakī has analyzed the problem of attribution in line with the pre-supposed elements. He agrees with the occurrence of existence to quiddity only in existence in the sense of existent in the mind. Mullā Ṣadrā has usually provided an incomplete narration of Dashtakī’s view of attribution, theory of predication, derivative, and the necessity of demonstrating the source of the predicate for the subject. In fact, he has explained all the related elements in one place. In his analysis of the subordination principle, he is completely influenced by Dashtakī. It seems that, in spite of his great efforts at providing a consistent narration of Dashtakī’s view, Mullā Ṣadrā has failed to present some elements consistently in his own theory. Manuscript profile
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  10 - Three Modalities of Being Based on Mullā Ṣadrā’s Three Philosophical Approaches
  Ali Babaei
  Mullā Ṣadrā’s philosophy has witnessed the rise of three approaches in its process of development: principiality of quiddity, principiality of existence based on graded unity, and principiality of existence based on individual unity. In the light of these three Sadrian More

  Mullā Ṣadrā’s philosophy has witnessed the rise of three approaches in its process of development: principiality of quiddity, principiality of existence based on graded unity, and principiality of existence based on individual unity. In the light of these three Sadrian philosophical approaches, the discussion of the ‘three modalities of being’ has undergone some fundamental changes. In conformity to the first approach, the source of division is quiddity, which is divided into ‘necessity, possibility, and impossibility’. At this level, possibility refers to quiddative possibility. In the second approach, the common three modalities are promoted to necessity and possibility. At this level, possibility refers to indigent and ontological possibility. In the third approach, the division evolves into a two-fold division of ‘truth and false’. The concept of truth in this approach shares the same meaning and references with the three other meanings of ‘truth’ in the third approach – priority of the truth, existence of truth, and true union - and bears a ‘paradigm and analogue’ relationship to the truth discussed in the mother of all propositions. In other words, the mother of all propositions is similar to Almighty Truth among all propositions. Almighty Truth is interpreted as the Highest Truth among all existents, and the principle of non-contradiction is interpreted as the truest of all sayings and the truest of all origins. All mentioned ‘truths’ can be propounded based on the principles of Mullā Ṣadrā’s third philosophical approach. Manuscript profile