برنامه ريزی مقاوم حمله تزريق داده غلط روی بازارهای انرژی الکتريکی در شبکه های هوشمند
الموضوعات :حامد بدرسیمایی 1 , رحمت‌الله هوشمند 2 , صغري نوبختيان 3
1 - دانشكده فنی مهندسی،دانشگاه اصفهان
2 - دانشگاه اصفهان،دانشگاه اصفهان
3 - دانشکده علوم ریاضی،دانشگاه اصفهان
الکلمات المفتاحية: بازار انرژی الکتریکی, حمله سایبری, حمله تزریق داده غلط, شبکه هوشمند, عدم قطعیت,
ملخص المقالة :
حمله تزریق داده غلط (FDIA) یک تهدید سایبری مخرب برای عملکرد اقتصادی بازارهای انرژی الکتریکی در شبکه‌های هوشمند است. یک مهاجم سایبری می‌تواند با پیاده‌سازی یک FDIA و با نفوذ در معاملات مجازیبازارهای انرژی الکتریکی، از طریق دستکاری قیمت برق به سود مالی گزافی دست پیدا کند. در این مقاله، روش جدیدی در مسأله برنامه‌ریزی یک FDIA به صورت کاملاً مخفی و با هدف دستیابی به بیشترین سود مالی از دیدگاه یک مهاجم سایبری مشارکت‌کننده در معاملات مجازی در دو بازار روز پیش (DA) و زمان حقیقی (RT) ارائه شده است. یک فرضیه رایج که در مطالعات موجود روی FDIAs در مقابل بازارهای برق صورت گرفته، این است که مهاجم، اطلاعات کاملی از شبکه هوشمند در اختیار دارد. اما واقعیت این است که مهاجم، منابع محدودی دارد و به سختی می‌تواند به همه اطلاعات شبکه دسترسی پیدا کند. این مقاله روش مقاومی را در طراحی استراتژی حمله با شرایط اطلاعات شبکه ناقص پیشنهاد می‌کند. به طور خاص فرض گردیده که مهاجم نسبت به ماتریس‌های مدل‌کننده شبکه دارای عدم قطعیت است. اعتبار روش پیشنهادی بر اساس سیستم معیار 14- باس IEEE و با استفاده از ابزار Matpower سنجیده شده است. نتایج عددی، موفقیت نسبی حمله پیشنهادی را در حالت‌های از درجه مختلف اطلاعات ناقص تأیید می‌کنند.
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